The " Monster that we need to Slay"?:Global Governance, the United States, and the International Criminal Court by Birdsall, Andrea
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The " Monster that we need to Slay"?
Citation for published version:
Birdsall, A 2010, 'The " Monster that we need to Slay"?: Global Governance, the United States, and the
International Criminal Court' Global Governance: A Review of Multilarteralism and International
Organizations, vol 16, no. 4, pp. 451-469., 10.5555/ggov.2010.16.4.451
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.5555/ggov.2010.16.4.451
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Preprint (usually an early version)
Published In:
Global Governance: A Review of Multilarteralism and International Organizations
Publisher Rights Statement:
© Birdsall, A. (2010). The " Monster that we need to Slay"?: Global Governance, the United States, and the
International Criminal Court. Global Governance: A Review of Multilarteralism and International Organizations,
16(4), 451-469. 10.5555/ggov.2010.16.4.451
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 20. Feb. 2015
 1 
The “Monster That We Need to Slay”? 
Global Governance, the United States, and the International Criminal Court 
 
Andrea Birdsall 
The International Criminal Court is a new mechanism for the global governance of 
human rights that enjoys broad support from a large number of states. The United 
States expressed its hostile opposition especially in the early years, claiming that the 
ICC was harmful to US national interests. This attitude toward the court changed 
over the years, and a more pragmatic approach toward the ICC is now discernible. 
The United States had to acknowledge actions taken in opposition to the ICC started 
to be harmful to its own national interests and it also realised the national-interest 
utility the court has despite the deep-seated opposition to the concept of supranational 
sovereignty. This article looks at the reasons for US opposition, its initial hostile 
position, and changes in the US approach towards the ICC.  
 
KEYWORDS: International Criminal Court, global governance, US opposition, 
international criminal justice, human rights. 
 
Heated outburst in the US Senate in 1998, just after the end of the Rome Conference, 
set the tone for the US position toward the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
Senator Rod Grams called it “dangerous” and a “monster” that needed to be slayed, 
and Senator Jesse Helms predicted that “as long as there is a breath in me, the United 
States will never—and I repeat never, never—allow its national security decisions to 
be judged by an international criminal court.”1  
 
Before negotiations for the ICC started in 1998, Congress had expressed general 
support for a permanent court in principle, arguing that such a court would “serve the 
interests of the United States and the world community” and that “the United States 
delegation should make every effort to advance this proposal at the United Nations.”2  
This support started to diminish, however, when the ICC came closer to reality during 
the negotiations in Rome and the US could not include the safeguards it wanted to 
achieve. The US under the Bush administration engaged in a number of hostile 
actions with the aim to exempt US citizens from the court. More recently, however, 
there have been signs that such open hostility is fading and that the United States is 
starting to engage with the court it could not prevent from being established.  
This article analyzes the ICC as an instrument of global governance of human 
rights and the US response to it. The US position towards the ICC is important 
because the court depends on its member states and would benefit from the support of 
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the remaining superpower in order to be strengthened and be able to operate more 
effectively.  
This article starts by looking at the main reasons why the United States claims 
that the court is not in its national interest. It then charts actions taken in opposition to 
the ICC and also more recent changes in US attitudes toward the court. The article 
concludes that the US started to engage with the court because it could no longer 
afford to ignore an international institution that has 111 member states, including 
some vital US allies, and that the opposition is harmful to its national interests—the 
very issue it wanted to protect in the first place.  
 
Creation of the ICC 
The ICC was created in 1998 during the United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court (known as the Rome Conference) that took place in Rome from 15 June to 17 
July. Nearly 160 states met to negotiate a “final act” for the proposed ICC. The 
negotiations were very complex, and by the end of the conference some of the key 
issues were still not resolved to everyone’s satisfaction. However, a “package deal” 
was put to the vote on 17 July 1998 with 120 states voting in favor, 7 against 
(including the US), and 21 abstaining.3 The ICC came into being on 1 July 2002, six 
months after the sixtieth state ratified the court’s Statute into its national laws. 
 
The ICC is a permanent and independent court that has jurisdiction over war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.4 The ICC constitutes a step away 
from the classic regime of state sovereignty toward integrating a broader framework 
of global governance to enforce international human rights and administer 
international criminal justice. The court’s Statute includes a number of compromises 
that were necessary to preserve the fundamental principle of state sovereignty but at 
the same time ensure that a functioning global mechanism for enforcing existing 
human rights laws could be created. One such compromise is the principle of 
complementarity which means that the court complements national jurisdiction and 
can only act if the state in question is genuinely unable or unwilling to investigate or 
prosecute itself. This places the primary responsibility for investigation and 
prosecution on national authorities. The principle of complementarity aims to 
strengthen rather than replace national courts in matters of enforcing international 
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laws by reinforcing states’ existing obligations. Yet, it also fills a gap when states 
either cannot or will not act to ensure the global enforcement of human rights. The 
principle thereby preserves state sovereignty in two respects: states can be sure of 
non-interference in their internal affairs if they act in accordance with their 
obligations, and they also continue to have primary responsibility toward their own 
people to enforce existing international legal obligations themselves. Achieving such 
a compromise was possible because the notion of sovereignty changed over the years 
to not only include rights for states but also obligations toward a state’s own citizens.5 
It can be argued that “there is a widening consensus that the protection of human 
rights is a matter of collective international concern and a legitimate object of foreign 
policy.”6 The main problem remains, however, that even though states sign up to a 
large number of international laws to protect human rights, the laws’ enforcement is 
still dependent on voluntary state cooperation.  
 
The United States and the ICC 
The ICC enjoys broad support from a large number of states, but the United States has 
so far refused to join the court. This opposition is out of line with US historic support 
for international criminal courts based on liberal values of human rights and the rule 
of law. The US played a leading role in the Nuremberg trials and in the creation in 
1994 of the UN ad hoc courts for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Even though 
the US engaged actively at the Rome Conference and subsequent meetings, it always 
maintained that acceptable protection measures had to be built into the Statute and 
was not satisfied with the compromises reached in Rome.  
The US position shifted with different administrations: the Clinton 
administration remained cautiously engaged with the court demonstrating general 
support for the idea of a permanent international court. The Bush administration, in 
contrast, took a number of actions to undermine the court, based on a unilateralist 
focus on national interests and national law enforcement. This initial hostility changed 
to a more pragmatic approach when the United States recognized that these actions 
could not stop the ICC from coming into being and were actually harmful to US 
interests. In mid-2010, the Obama administration is still reviewing its official policy 
regarding the ICC but has already stated that it will end US hostility toward the court 
and continue to cooperate in the investigation currently taking place in Darfur, Sudan.  
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Changes in the American stance towards the ICC reflect differences of what is 
considered by the respective administrations to constitute the ‘national interest’ and 
whether the ICC can be used as a tool to further it. In particular, the Bush 
administration acted from a realist position of focussing on national interests rather 
than collective values of a liberal order beneficial to the international community as a 
whole. State interests are not a static given but change over time and adjust to 
changing circumstances. “Rather, national interests are intersubjective understandings 
about what it takes to advance power, influence and wealth, that survive the political 
process, given the distribution of power and knowledge in a society.”7 Looking at 
changes of the US position through such a constructivist lens will help understand 
how national interests are created and how they influence policy making8 as a way of 
understanding the evolution of the US position over time.  
 
Issues of Opposition  
US opposition to the ICC focuses on two main areas: the court’s jurisdiction as set out 
in Article 12, and a criticism that the ICC is independent from the UN Security 
Council and does not recognize the “special” role the United States plays as a major 
superpower in international relations.  
 
Article 12 and the ICC’s Jurisdiction 
The United States opposes Article 12 of the Statute, which gives the ICC jurisdiction 
if the offense is committed on a state party’s territory or if the accused is a national of 
an ICC member state. This means that—at least in theory—the ICC could exercise 
jurisdiction over US nationals if they were accused of committing an ICC crime on a 
state party’s territory, without the need for US consent.9 The United States argues that 
this would in effect give the ICC—as an international institution—universal 
jurisdiction, which is not part of customary international law.10 This view is 
controversial and rejected by international lawyers “on the simple basis that while a 
non-party state is not itself bound to accept an assertion of jurisdiction over itself 
unless it has consented, the same is not true of its nationals if they commit offenses in 
the territory of a state that is a party.”11 Individuals are subject to states’ territorial 
jurisdictions, which includes the possibility of extradition to an international court.  
The fact that the ICC can exercise jurisdiction over third parties without a 
need for additional express consent is part of the court’s fundamental set-up: it 
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empowers the court to investigate and prosecute individuals for the most serious 
crimes that are already established in international law, independent from states. The 
United States agreed to such provisions in other treaties, such as the Torture 
Convention, which allows (and even requires) prosecution or extradition of alleged 
criminals regardless of their nationality. The ICC is based on precedents set by such 
conventions and also the ad hoc courts, which similarly do not require express state 
consent. Given that they enjoy US support, it is evident “that there is no objection in 
principle to the idea of international courts”12 but that the objection is only related to 
an international court exercising criminal jurisdiction over Americans.  
The crimes in the ICC’s Statute are already established in international treaties 
and conventions and the Statute therefore does not create new laws13; it establishes a 
new collective enforcement mechanism for already accepted universal norms.14 This 
means that “the failure of the US to become a party to the ICC does not exempt its 
citizens from the universality already established.”15 Even though the ICC draws most 
immediately from territorial and national jurisdiction, it receives added support from 
the increasingly important notion of universal jurisdiction. This is the point where the 
ICC adds to existing provisions and where it seeks to fill a gap: it constitutes a global 
enforcement mechanism for universal values aimed to be largely independent from 
states.  
 
Great Power Responsibility and the Security Council Veto 
The United States claims that even though it supports the overall aims of the ICC, it is 
concerned that the ICC could threaten the independence and flexibility of US military 
forces. Some argue that the US – as only remaining superpower - should be given 
special protection and that the ICC “fails to recognize [the US’] unique 
responsibilities in the world when issues of international peace and security are 
involved.”16 Others, however, point out that even though the United States does have 
unique responsibilities as a great power, “when it claims to act for the common good 
of international society . . . it also has a democratic duty to be accountable to 
international society for the way it fulfils those responsibilities.”17 The United States 
is accountable for its actions to the international community in whose name it claims 
to act, which also means that it cannot impose double standards, exempting its own 
citizens from acting in accordance with justice norms others have to adhere to. 
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The ICC is independent from the UN, which is a major concern for the United 
States because it cannot fully control the ICC through its powers in the Security 
Council. The Security Council can refer a situation18 to the ICC prosecutor when 
acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which makes the establishment of any 
further ad hoc tribunals unnecessary. This gives the Security Council the power to 
still be able to intervene judicially in a situation it deems a threat to peace and security 
by making use of the ICC as a standing court.  
More controversially, however, the Security Council does not have the power 
to halt proceedings taking place before the ICC. Article 16 of the Statute sets out that 
the Security Council can defer (but not terminate) an investigation or prosecution for 
a period of twelve months (with the possibility of renewal). To do this, the Council 
cannot simply veto ICC action but has to adopt a declaration to postpone proceedings, 
which requires a minimum of nine affirmative votes. By having to vote in favor of 
deferring ICC action, the possibility of unilateral veto against the ICC by any one of 
the Security Council’s permanent members is removed.  
Article 16 represents a significant development integrated into the Statute 
because it means that no one state (including the five permanent members of the 
Security Council) can unilaterally control ICC proceedings. The role of the Security 
Council in maintaining peace and security is still integrated in the Statute (by having 
the power to refer cases and suspend proceedings if deemed necessary), but the 
Council is awarded only limited powers. This removal of direct Security Council 
control over the court is an “innovative aspect”19 of the Statute, necessary to make it 
possible for the ICC to function independently from the UN as a political body. This 
compromise was important because of the different natures of the two institutions: the 
UN is a state-centred institution, primarily concerned with protecting the inviolability 
of state sovereignty, whereas the ICC aims to enforce justice for individuals 
universally, independent from different states’ national interests.  
The United States has criticized this lack of Security Council control because 
it argues that US soldiers are required in a large number of UN missions to restore or 
maintain peace and security, which makes them uniquely vulnerable to possible ICC 
jurisdiction. Other permanent members of the Security Council, such as the UK and 
France (and to a degree Russia, which at least signed the treaty), however, that also 
commit peacekeeping forces to UN missions were satisfied with existing safeguards 
incorporated into the Statute. This begs the question, Why were they not sufficient for 
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the United States? The answer might lie in the fact that even though the ICC was 
created to work alongside the UN and not to undermine it, it also attempted to do 
indirectly what could not be done directly; namely, to reform the UN by removing 
direct Security Council control. This challenge to the Security Council can be seen on 
the one hand as a reason for the US opposition, but on the other as a cause for the 
enthusiasm and support of such a large number of states that support the idea of equal 
treatment.20 As Samantha Power argues: “Many deem the Security Council as the 
epitome of a politically motivated institution and want an independent ICC precisely 
because they believe it will not be driven strictly by great power politics.”21  
 
Staying Engaged—Clinton’s Signing of the Treaty 
The US did not vote in favour of the ICC in Rome which was mainly down to the fact 
that the US could not fully control ICC actions in case they went against possible US 
interests. This meant that the US attempted to “maintain great power hegemony over 
international justice.”22 Despite the opposition to the Statute as it emerged from the 
Rome Conference in 1998, the US delegation continued to engage in the Preparatory 
Commission meetings that followed, which aimed at negotiating further details of the 
Statute, such as elements of crimes and the rules of procedure and evidence. David 
Scheffer, then US ambassador at large for War Crimes Issues and head of the US 
delegation, believed that enough progress had been made in the negotiations after 
Rome to reconsider the US position on whether to sign the Statute. He was convinced 
that the US delegation had achieved “the most that pragmatically could be achieved in 
light of all that we confronted, both internally and externally: a sophisticated matrix of 
safeguards that provided a high degree of protection for US interests and . . . 
additional safeguards that would achieve the best possible relationship for the United 
States with the ICC.”23 He argued that some compromises were necessary to achieve 
a greater good of enforcing universal norms globally, and he also believed that the 
United States could gain from membership to the court.  
 
There were a lot of divisions within the administration and opposition at the 
Senate. 24 Senator Jesse Helms, then Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, argued that the Court would be ‘dead-on-arrival’ in Senate, if the treaty 
did not include United States’ veto powers over which cases were brought before it.25 
“The Senate's opposition to the Court was based on the perception that the Court 
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unduly threatened US sovereignty and its military personnel stationed overseas. … 
such opposition to the Court represents an electoral logic or political reality in which 
realist concerns now reproduce domestic political outcomes that are not favorable to 
international human rights norms.”26 Despite this domestic opposition, Scheffer was 
still convinced that signing the Statute was beneficial for the US in order be able “to 
negotiate further Treaty-friendly proposals and thus protect American interests while 
pursuing international justice.”27 In line with a constructivist approach of evolving 
national interests, he emphasised the possible utility of the ICC for US interests and 
being able to use the court whenever necessary.  
 
On 31 December 2000, the last possible day for signature, President Bill 
Clinton decided to sign the Statute and expressed US “strong support for international 
accountability and for bringing to justice perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity.”28 He argued that the United States signed the treaty in 
order to “remain engaged in making the ICC an instrument of impartial and effective 
justice in the years to come” and to sustain the tradition of US “moral leadership” in 
its commitment to individual accountability. Yet, Clinton also made clear that the 
United States was still not satisfied with the Rome Statute in its present form and that 
“in signing, however, we are not abandoning our concerns about significant flaws in 
the treaty.” He acknowledged existing domestic opposition and did “not recommend 
my successor submit the treaty to the Senate for advice and consent until our 
fundamental concerns are satisfied.” He concluded that the ICC could make a 
“profound contribution in deterring egregious human rights abuses worldwide” and 
that by signing, the United States wanted to continue to engage in discussion with 
other governments in order to advance these goals. Clinton recognised that it was in 
the US national interested to stay engaged with the ICC and be able to take part in 
future negotiations. His administration supported the broader goals of the court and 
hoped that US involvement would eventually lead to changes in the Statute more in 
line with US interests.  
 
Hostile Opposition—Bush’s ‘Un-signing’ of the Treaty 
The Bush administration did not take a favorable approach to the ICC from the start 
and did not engage constructively in the Preparatory Commission meetings once it 
took over from its predecessor in 2001. John Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms 
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Control and International Security in the Bush Administration, argued that “America's 
posture toward the ICC should be “Three Noes”: no financial support, directly or 
indirectly; no cooperation; and no further negotiations with other governments to 
“improve” the ICC.”29 Scheffer criticised the “short-sighted and anaemic approach”30 
of the administration and believed that it resulted in forfeiting opportunities his 
delegation had initiated in preceding meetings.  
On 6 May 2002, President George W. Bush decided to formally withdraw 
from the Rome treaty and to effectively “un-sign” it.31 Bolton issued a letter to the 
UN that the United States did not want to become part of the ICC and therefore did 
not have any legal obligations toward the court arising from Clinton’s signature. 
Bolton, probably the most vocal opponent to the ICC during the Bush administration, 
once described the ICC as “a product of fuzzy-minded romanticism [that] is not just 
naive, but dangerous,”32 maintained that the ICC was “a stealth approach to eroding 
our constitutionalism and undermining the independence and flexibility that our 
military forces need to defend our interests around the world.”33  
The move to un-sign the treaty was in line with a general shift of the Bush 
administration’s attitude away from multilateralism: “rather than unveiling new 
initiatives, the focus of Bush’s foreign policy during his first eight months in office 
was on extracting the United States from existing ones.”34 In line with a realist 
approach towards foreign policy, the Bush administration put a stronger focus on 
national interests and unilateral action. As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 
already set out in 2000, the administration’s foreign policy would “proceed from the 
firm ground of the national interest, not from the interests of an illusory international 
community.”35  
This position intensified further after September 11, 2001. The National 
Security Strategy of 2002 set out an agenda for possible unilateral and pre-emptive 
action in the pursuit of national security that also involved new interpretations of 
international law to justify such conduct. Public support for Bush’s policies increased, 
and Congress authorized him to “use all necessary and appropriate force” in the “war 
on terror,” giving the president almost unchecked powers to make foreign policy 
decisions. This move “partly reflected the enormity of the [September 11] attacks and 
a principled belief that crises require lawmakers to accede to strong presidential 
leadership. But Congress’s deference also reflected the Democratic Party’s weakness 
on foreign and defense policy. . . . Worried that their criticisms would at best not be 
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credible with the American people and at worst might sound unpatriotic, most 
Democratic lawmakers who would have preferred to criticize the White House opted 
for silence.”36 
Un-signing the ICC Statute underlined the US state-centred and unilateralist 
view that realizing justice for victims of serious human rights abuses was part of 
individual states’ sovereignty and not an issue for global governance (i.e., an 
international institution intervening in internal affairs). The Bush administration’s 
realist approach towards international relations emphasised the importance of state 
sovereignty and national interests that questioned the utility of international 
institutions in general.  As Undersecretary for Political Affairs, Marc Grossman 
argued that, “states, not international institutions are primarily responsible for 
ensuring justice in the international system.”37 However, by withdrawing from the 
treaty, the United States also lost any form of control it might have had otherwise in 
shaping the ICC and its workings and also the possibility of using the ICC for their 
own interests. This raised concerns for US officials and might be a reason why—after 
the initial hostile and active opposition—the Bush administration had to change its 
approach toward the ICC in more recent years. 
Un-signing the treaty was condemned by a number of different groups. 
Several members of Congress sent a letter to President Bush in which they objected 
that this action “has damaged the moral credibility of the United States and serves as a 
US repudiation of the notion that war criminals and perpetrators of genocide should 
be brought to justice.”38 They argued that the United States had the same values as 
those intended by the ICC and that rejecting the institution “now places the United 
States in the company of notorious human rights abusers like Iraq, North Korea, 
China, Cuba, Libya, and Burma.” The EU also formally issued a declaration on behalf 
of its member states criticizing the US position and stating its “disappointment and 
regret.”39 It argued that the EU respected the sovereign right of the United States not 
to sign the treaty but also believed that “this unilateral action may have undesirable 
consequences on multilateral treaty-making and generally on the rule of law in 
international relations.”  
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US Actions in Opposition the ICC 
Since the United States could not prevent the ICC from coming into force, it 
undertook a number of actions to undermine the workings of the court and to exempt 
US nationals from its reach.  
 
UN Resolutions 
In 2002, the United States vetoed the extension of the UN peacekeeping mission to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and also threatened to withdraw all of its other UN 
peacekeeping forces because it claimed that US soldiers were at risk of possible ICC 
jurisdiction on that territory. Justifying this action, the US ambassador to the UN, 
John Negroponte, argued that even though it was unfortunate that the United States 
had to veto the extension of the mission, it was not prepared to ask its peacekeepers 
“to accept the additional risk of politicized prosecutions before a court whose 
jurisdiction over our people the Government of the United States does not accept.”40 
He maintained that the United States was still committed to contributing to UN 
peacekeeping missions but that a compromise to solve this problem needed to be 
found. The United States proposed complete immunity for UN peacekeepers by 
adopting a resolution in line with Article 16 of the Statute with the prospect of 
renewing it after twelve months.  
Despite criticisms expressed by a number of states (most of which were not 
allowed to vote), Resolution 1422 was adopted unanimously by the members of the 
Security Council, exempting peacekeeping personnel from the ICC’s jurisdiction for a 
period of twelve months. The resolution was renewed for another twelve months in 
2003.41  
In May 2004, the United States sought to renew Resolution 1422 for a second 
time, but it faced stiff opposition from a number of states and eventually decided to 
withdraw the request. One major argument of the opposition was the growing concern 
about revelations of abuse against prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq by US 
troops. Kofi Annan believed that requesting an exemption for the United States in this 
situation would seem hypocritical and would impose double standards because the 
United States was accused of having violated universal standards of justice in the way 
it treated Iraqi prisoners.42 US officials interpreted the situation to the contrary, 
arguing that Abu Ghraib proved that “the United States does stand for justice and will 
itself impose justice on any members of our services who might undertake things that 
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constitute international crimes. . . . But it’s a matter for us to take care of and not for 
some court with some jurisdiction that we’re not party to.”43 The United States 
thereby emphasised that even though it proclaimed to be committed to protecting and 
enforcing justice norms, this could only be achieved through national courts without 
external intervention. However, Colin Powell admitted that Abu Ghraib had affected 
the way people looked at the ICC and conceded that it was less likely the United 
States would be able to achieve another renewal of the resolution under these 
circumstances.44 The United States eventually decided to withdraw its request, 
arguing that it did not want to engage the Security Council in a “prolonged and 
divisive debate.”45  
This reversal of strict opposition to the ICC is evidence of a constructivist 
approach towards foreign policy making whereby foreign policy is what elites can 
make of it in a given context. The US still acted from the premise of its national 
interests, but these are an ongoing process of practice and interaction and therefore 
change over time. The US was forced to change its position given the circumstances 
and had to adjust its policy accordingly. However, it still emphasised the importance 
of its own interests and therefore issued a statement to the UN in which it argued that 
failure to renew the resolution would mean that the United States “will need to take 
into account the risk of ICC review when determining contributions to UN authorized 
or established operations.”46 A few days later, the Defense Department announced 
that it would withdraw personnel from peacekeeping missions in Ethiopia and Eritrea 
and also Kosovo because they were perceived to be at risk of possible ICC 
jurisdiction. Altogether, nine individuals were withdrawn at the time. This was done 
to continue US opposition to the ICC, but it was less ‘radical’ than other actions taken 
previously which showed that policy had to be adjusted to changing circumstances. 
 
Additional Measures  
Since the UN resolutions only protected US personnel acting as part of UN 
peacekeeping missions and only for a limited period of time, the United States sought 
to implement additional measures to exempt all its nationals from the ICC 
permanently. The two most important measures implemented by the Bush 
administration are bilateral immunity agreements (BIAs) and the American 
Servicemembers Protection Act (ASPA).  
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The bilateral so-called Article 98 agreements47 between the United States and 
individual states stipulate that US personnel and nationals cannot be detained, 
arrested, or sent to the ICC. The original intent of Article 98 was to cover so-called 
Status of Force Agreements (SOFAs) between the United States and other countries 
(mainly NATO states) that give the United States primacy in exercising jurisdiction 
over US personnel acting on foreign soil. The Bush administration, however, used this 
provision to seek exemptions from a number of different states, exerting strong 
diplomatic and financial pressure if states refused to sign with “many of the states 
approached . . . too weak to resist.”48  
At the time of writing, 102 states have signed BIAs, including 52 ICC member 
states.49 Larger and more influential states, such as Canada and states in the EU, have 
refused to sign BIAs, arguing that doing so would be inconsistent with their 
obligations as ICC state parties. The European Parliament even issued an official 
position in which it not only outlines its opposition to these agreements but also 
argues that “ratifying such an agreement is incompatible with membership of the 
EU.”50  
In addition, the Bush administration signed the American Servicemembers 
Protection Act (ASPA) into law51, authorizing the United States to use “all means 
necessary, including military force, to rescue a US citizen taken into the court’s 
custody.” This provision led the ASPA to be called “The Hague Invasion Act.” It 
limits US cooperation with the ICC, including the ability to collaborate, extradite, 
support, fund, and share classified information. The ASPA also imposes prohibition 
of military aid to states parties of the ICC but allows waivers if it is in the US national 
interest, if states signed Article 98 agreements and also for NATO states and major 
NATO allies. 
 
Changing US Perceptions 
Since the ICC’s first actions in 2004, however, the United States seems to have 
adopted a more pragmatic approach toward the court, and a shift is discernible from 
the initial firm opposition to a fresh assessment of the court.  
One reason for this change in attitude is the admission by a number of 
influential US politicians that BIAs and the ASPA are actually harmful to US 
interests. Cuts in military assistance to countries that have not signed BIAs mean lost 
opportunities of military training provided by US troops aimed at strengthening US 
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links to other countries, particularly in its fight against terrorism abroad. The US 
Defense Department severely criticized the effects these measures have had on 
military operations and cooperation in strategically important regions (such as Latin 
America and Africa). In 2006, a US Army Commander argued that the restrictions 
placed on US assistance in such countries gave China the opportunity to fill a void 
and step up its efforts to gain influence.52 Furthermore, Condoleezza Rice admitted 
that the Article 98 agreements are like “shooting ourselves in the foot.” In September 
2006, the US Congress passed an amendment that repeals the section of the ASPA 
that restricts international military education and training (IMET) funds to ICC states 
parties. By September 2008, the United States waived and retracted a large number of 
restrictions related to countries refusing to sign BIAs as well as all ASPA sanction 
provisions. The United States conceded that the policy of Article 98 restrictions had 
failed and needed to be eliminated “once and for all.”53 
 
US and ICC Action in Darfur 
Contrary to its overall hostility towards the ICC in general, the United States 
demonstrated its support for ICC action in Darfur, Sudan, from the start. The United 
States actively engaged in drafting a UN resolution that was eventually put to a vote 
in March 2005. The United States did not veto this resolution (it abstained) and even 
declared to be prepared to assist the court if asked. This resolution is controversial, 
however, because no other nonstate party can be prosecuted without its consent by the 
ICC. The United States thus ensured that its own citizens continue to remain outside 
the court’s jurisdiction. This was important not only from a practical point of view, 
but also meant that the United States was not seen as giving outright support for the 
ICC and as having abandoned its concerns regarding the court. The abstention can be 
seen as a trade off: the US did not want to legitimise the ICC by voting in favour of 
the resolution but because it had called the situation in Darfur ‘genocide’, it invoked 
an obligation to act under international law.  
The administration also faced a lot of domestic pressures from its own ranks to 
act in Darfur. John Danforth, former ambassador to the UN, admitted that the Bush 
administration labelled the situation as genocide to please the Christian right ahead of 
the presidential elections. He said that “it was of great interest to Christian 
conservatives in the United States, a good part of President Bush’s base and it was 
something that was of personal interest to him.”54 
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This conflict between public diplomacy towards Darfur and the opposition 
against the ICC was politically unsustainable. By abstaining, the US could find a 
compromise that allowed it to maintain its opposition to the ICC while at the same 
time showing tacit support for the international rule of law against genocide. As Ralph 
argues, however, the way “the administration was able to use the Security Council 
referral process to negotiate exemptions for its own citizens suggests that US policy 
had not really shifted at all.”55 
A number of US officials acknowledged the role of the ICC in the conflict in 
Darfur. The State Department’s chief lawyer, John Bellinger, conceded that the 
United States could not delegitimize a court that has more that 100 member states 
including a number of major US allies. He argued that even though the Bush 
administration would never allow US nationals to be tried by the ICC, “We do 
acknowledge that it has a role to play in the overall system of international justice.”56 
In September 2006, Republican politicians John McCain and Bob Dole agreed that 
the ICC had jurisdiction to prosecute war crimes committed in Darfur, thereby 
sending a strong signal that US leaders accepted the existence of the ICC and are 
willing to prosecute high officials in office.57  
Overall, it can be argued that the initial active opposition of the Bush 
administration gradually gave way to a more pragmatic approach toward the ICC as a 
working global governance institution for some of the most serious human rights 
abuses. This change was partly due to some vocal opponents (such as John Bolton in 
2006) leaving the administration and also because of pragmatic considerations over 
time. Clint Williamson, ambassador for War Crimes Issues at the time, argued that 
there was a need to bridge the divide between the United States and its allies over the 
ICC: “so what has happened is, you have this quiet change. No statement that policy 
was changing, and certainly no admission that the initial approach to the ICC was in 
any way wrong. The change has been incremental. . . . What we have done is just 
implement this policy on the working levels.”58 The United States acknowledged that 
the ICC was an appropriate forum to try some of the most serious human rights 
abuses in certain cases. It also showed, however, that the US started to use the court to 
protect its national interests whenever it suited its policy agenda. The US used the 
resolution on Sudan to protect its own soldiers and also to appease the Christian right 
and other interest groups that wanted to see action in Darfur. Abstaining meant that 
the US could act without having to detract its public opposition to the court. This 
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demonstrates that national interests are not fixed, but in line with a constructivist 
approach can be seen as changing: once the Bush administration realised that the ICC 
could be used to protect its soldiers, it changed its rhetoric to suit its national interests. 
The US maintained that it opposed the ICC because it had the potential to limit 
state sovereignty by enforcing universal values through an international institution 
that was unaccountable to the UN and also the US. Countermeasures such as the 
Article 98 agreements, however, started to prevent the US from exerting influence in 
strategically important states in its ‘war on terror’. Rather than continuing its active 
opposition, the US found the ICC to be a useful element of ‘coercive diplomacy’59 
against rogue states such as Sudan. The US could use the ICC as a tool without 
having to use military force to intervene in a situation it had labelled ‘genocide’. As 
George argues: “In employing coercive diplomacy (…) one gives the adversary an 
opportunity to stop or back off before one resorts to military operations.” and further, 
“coercive diplomacy is an attractive strategy insofar that it offers the possibility of 
achieving one’s objectives in a crisis economically, with little or no bloodshed, fewer 
political and psychological costs, and often with less risk of unwanted escalation than 
does traditional military strategy.” 60 This is an attractive strategy for a powerful state 
like the US that can influence a weaker state with relatively little costs and risks.  
 
The Obama Administration’s Approach 
With Bush leaving the White House and Democratic president Barrack Obama taking 
office, it can be anticipated that the US policy toward the ICC will continue to be 
more cooperative and less hostile. It is still too early to be certain how the Obama 
administration will choose to relate to the court, but initial signs point to positive 
engagement. Obama outlined the strengthening of international institutions as one of 
his administration’s foreign policy priorities which signals a rhetoric shift from 
Bush’s unilateral policy making towards increased mutltilateralism. 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton laid out the Obama administration’s 
approach by stating that “we will end hostility towards the ICC, and look for 
opportunities to encourage effective ICC action in ways to promote US interests by 
bringing war criminals to justice.”61 In contrast to the Bush’s administration’s 
unilateralist stance, the Obama administration seems to engage in a more multilateral 
approach toward international human rights in general. Susan E. Rice, US ambassador 
to the UN, stated that the United States is committed to ending violations of 
 17 
international humanitarian law in conjunction with the UN and other international 
organizations. She also argued that the ICC “looks to become an important and 
credible instrument for trying to hold accountable the senior leadership responsible 
for atrocities committed in the Congo, Uganda, and Darfur.”62 
It is very likely that the United States will participate actively in the 2010 
Review Conference, in which issues such as the definition of the crime of aggression 
will be negotiated. The United States can take part as a non-state party, although 
joining the ICC would give it even stronger leverage in the negotiations. The US sent 
a delegation to the ICC’s Assembly of States Parties’ meeting in November 2009 
which was the first time that the US had attended a meeting of the ICC since 2001. At 
this stage, however, it is not realistic to expect the United States to ratify the ICC 
Statute, but it is likely that Obama will engage in first steps toward it—such as 
reinstating the US signature to be able to participate in and support the court’s 
meetings and activities. Arguably, such action would not be a complete change from 
US policies toward the end of the Bush administration, but it would indicate a further 
movement toward improving its relationship with the court.  
  
Conclusion 
US actions in opposition to the ICC were to a large extent based on the understanding 
that human rights law enforcement can only be administered by sovereign states and 
not through a mechanism of global governance of justice. The United States is 
predominantly concerned about protecting its national interests and in maintaining its 
unique powerful position in international relations. Yet, the United States is 
inconsistent in its approach to international justice dispensed through international 
courts: it showed strong support for the ad hoc tribunals but engaged in hostile actions 
against the ICC. The United States opposes the ICC because it is an independent 
institution not controlled by the UN Security Council, which means that there is at 
least a theoretical possibility that the ICC can compromise US sovereignty on issues 
related to universally recognized human rights norms.  The US changed its active 
opposition towards the court when it realised the utility of such an international 
regime for genocide and crimes against humanity that has been proven in practice. 
Thus resulting in the shift in the US’ position and rearticulation of its stance towards 
the ICC that has been seen since Rome. 
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The initial actions taken in opposition to the ICC are problematic because 
other states are being prevented from cooperating and assisting the court in its 
operations. These actions were intended to intimidate the court’s supporters with the 
aim of achieving further concessions and exclusions from the ICC’s jurisdiction. They 
were also based on a belief that the United States could prevent the court from coming 
into being. So far, however, the ICC has proved to be too strong, which is due to the 
strong foundation on which the ICC is built. Since the end of World War II, a number 
of developments toward increased global governance of international criminal justice 
and international law have taken place. The ad hoc tribunals, for instance, were the 
last in a line of numerous changes in the way human rights are being enforced 
internationally. The ICC is the latest step toward internalizing enforcement of justice 
and human rights norms that are incorporated in international law. A large number of 
states see the ICC as a necessary global governance institution for the enforcement of 
such laws that includes enough safeguards to not erode state sovereignty dramatically. 
The ICC is only a court of last resort; it is aimed not at changing existing power 
relations and undermining the predominant position of the United States but at 
protecting human rights.  
The fact that the United States abstained from the Security Council resolutions 
related to ICC action in Darfur is evidence that it is trying to find more practical ways 
to work with the court and its supporters (rather than continue its active opposition). 
The US government even started to cooperate with the ICC in calling the government 
of Sudan to enforce the ICC’s arrest warrant and in acknowledging the ICC’s role in 
the overall system of justice. This is an important step because in the world following 
September 11 it is necessary to be consistent with existing fundamental principles of 
the liberal democratic order, which includes multilateral action and recognizes the 
importance of universal principles, human rights, and international law. As David 
Held argues, “What is needed is a movement of global, not American or French or 
British, justice and legitimacy.”63  
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